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Eloquence in the Defense of Deism: 
Voltaire’s Histoire de Jenni 
 
 
Thomas M. Carr, Jr. 
 
In the Histoire de Jenni (1775), his last major conte, Voltaire returns to a pattern similar in 
many ways to the one he had used in his first important tale, Micromégas. In both, as 
Vivienne Mylne has pointed out, two discussion scenes—the first near the beginning of 
the tale and a second more substantial one—are set in a narrative frame involving a voy-
age.1 Critics have generally attributed this return to a structure relying heavily on debate 
to convey his message to Voltaire’s increasing use of the philosophical dialogue in his later 
years.2 Perhaps a more fruitful approach, however, is to emphasize Voltaire’s reliance in 
Jenni on eloquence. To be sure, Freind’s debates with the Bachelor of Salamanca and the 
atheist Birton have much in common with dialogues like L’ABC or Le Dîner du comte de 
Boulainvilliers. But unlike these rather intimate discussions, the dialogues in Jenni are public 
events in which the opponents attempt to influence a large audience. And precisely be-
cause of this a more expansive, highly charged style is appropriate. In fact, both traditional 
aspects of eloquence are pressed into service—l’art de persuader and l’art de bien dire. In 
addition, Jenni contains numerous minor displays of eloquence, making its use the distinc-
tive feature of the conte’s construction. So pervasive is eloquence that characterization and, 
to some extent, plot are shaped by its needs. I also hope to show that eloquence is especially 
suited to the defense of Voltaire’s deistic credo. 
It is not surprising that Voltaire calls upon eloquence, for his interest in it was lifelong 
and particularly strong during the Ferney period. At Louis-le-Grand Voltaire, like all pu-
pils of the Jesuits, received a thorough grounding in rhetoric. His professors during his 
year of rhetoric (1709–1710), Fathers Lejay and Porée, were both authors of Latin treatises 
on the subject.3 In 1755 Voltaire surveyed rhetorical theory for the Encyclopédie in the article 
“Eloquence.” As his campaign against l’Infâme and for legal reform intensified, he turned 
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increasingly to various forms of eloquence to stir up public opinion. Works like the Homé-
lies prononcées à Londres attacked the Church, while a series of mémoires defended the Calas 
and other victims of judicial tyranny. During the months preceding the publication of Jenni, 
Voltaire frequently referred to eloquence in his letters as he prepared mémoires in behalf of 
young Etallonde, who had been implicated in the La Barre affair.4 
But why did Voltaire turn to eloquence in this conte? After all, its central issue, God’s 
existence and His relation to men, seems to belong to philosophy rather than to rhetoric. 
A look at the circumstances of Jenni’s composition and Voltaire’s views on the role of rea-
son in eloquence provides a tentative answer. The Histoire de Jenni is considered to be in 
large measure a response to Holbach’s Système de la nature (1770). Although Voltaire does 
not mention the materialist philosopher by name, his reference to “un frenchman qui dit 
que rien n’existe et ne peut exister, sinon la nature”5 is almost certainly to the baron. Over 
and over in his correspondence and pamphlets Voltaire stated that the Système was dan-
gerous because of its eloquence. “II y a beaucoup de choses qui peuvent séduire, il y a de 
l’éloquence” (Best. D16565). He labeled Holbach “cet éloquent athée” (Best. D16388). The 
only consolation he could find was that, except for a few such brilliant chapters, “tout le 
reste est déclamation et répétition” (Best. D16786). 
Voltaire saw reason as the basis of eloquence. In his Encyclopédie article he wrote that 
“la dialectique est le fondement de l’art de persuader, et qu’être éloquent c’est savoir prou-
ver” (XVIIL.5l5). Likewise, he referred to “des idées vraies et profondes” as “la source ca-
chée de l’éloquence” (Best. D15418). Yet many of his references to eloquence show that he 
saw it chiefly as an aid to reason, a supplement which could increase the force of reason. 
Writing to Richelieu about one of the duke’s lawsuits, he said, “Heureusement les preuves 
sont si fortes qu’elles n’ont besoin d’aucune éloquence” (Best. D19342). He pictured elo-
quence as the passport of reason (Best. D16390). In the Philosophe ignorant he notes that a 
philosopher relying on reason alone will have less influence than an eloquent man: “aucun 
philosophe n’a influé seulement sur les moeurs de la rue où il demeurait. Pourquoi? parce 
que les hommes se conduisent par la coutume et non par la métaphysique. Un seul homme 
éloquent, habile, et accrédité, pourra beaucoup sur les hommes; cent philosophes n’y pour-
ront rien s’ils ne sont que philosophes” (XXVI.69). Part of the power of eloquence stems 
perhaps from the fact that it appeals to the whole man, rather than to just the intellectual 
faculties. Voltaire recognized that its goal is broader than that of philosophy; “plaire, con-
vaincre et toucher à la fois” (XVIII.515) is eloquence’s aim. It is thus particularly appropri-
ate in Jenni where it is a question not just of winning Jenni’s adhesion to the proposition 
that God exists, but of bringing him to reform his entire way of life. 
Voltaire had perhaps another motive for invoking the aid of eloquence. He was aware 
that reason could not provide absolutely conclusive demonstrations for key points of his 
credo. His standard was admittedly high: the certainty of geometric proof. He described 
geometric demonstrations as having a sort of overwhelming immediacy: “une persuasion 
pleine, une conviction lumineuse, dans laquelle l’esprit se repose sans aucun doute” 
(XXVI.327). Voltaire admitted that in law (XVIII.118–19), medicine (XXIX.330), and even 
metaphysics (XVIII.377) men have to deal in probabilities, rather than absolute certainties. 
For example, to prove that God rewards or punishes men after death it is necessary to 
establish the immortality of the soul. Yet Voltaire remained skeptical on this point all his 
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life. He consistently maintained that God exists, yet many texts indicate that His existence 
could not be proved with the compelling force of a mathematical demonstration. As early 
as the Traité de métaphysique in the 1730’s Voltaire described the proposition there is a God 
only as “la chose la plus vraisemblable que les hommes puissent penser” (XXII.202). He 
expressed the idea several time that God’s existence belongs to the realm of probability, 
although he did see the degree of probability as so high as to almost constitute a certainty—
it is “une probabilité qui approche de la plus grande certitude” (XVIII.358; cf. XXIX.330).6 
Because of this awareness of the limits of reason, the particular brand of eloquence Freind 
envisages is quite an asset. He does not wish to bypass the intellect completely: “Le grand 
secret est de démontrer avec éloquence” (XXI.550). But he thinks it more important to aim 
for the heart. This ideal comes across clearly in his rejection of Clarke’s proofs for God’s 
existence: “ils sont plus faits pour vous éclairer que pour vous toucher: je ne veux vous 
apporter que des raisons qui peut-être parleront à votre coeur” (XXI.552). 
Before examining how this eloquence bolsters Friend’s defense of deism, it will be help-
ful to consider how plot and character add to the effectiveness of the speeches and debates. 
Unlike Voltaire’s sermons and homelies, where the characterization of the orator and his 
audience is minimal, in Jenni the rhetorical situation of each speech is fully developed. The 
use of eloquence within a narrative structure makes the speeches more dramatic and al-
lows character to play an important role as an agent of persuasion. 
The plot’s travel frame is loose enough for Voltaire to treat us to a wide variety of ora-
torical displays. Besides the two major debates, there is the sermon by the Inquisitor, 
Freind’s parliamentary defense of Peterborough, a rather ingenuous welcoming speech by 
an Indian chief, as well as a minor debate on cannibalism between Birton and Freind. At 
the same time, the action illustrates the conte’s thesis. In the first section Jenni is rescued 
from physical danger caused by fanaticism and superstition represented by the Inquisition. 
In the middle part it is moral ruin which threatens him as he falls under the influence of 
the atheist Birton and Clive-Hart. He is finally saved by eloquence when he responds to 
his father’s refutation of atheism and appeals to return to a life of honnêteté. 
The characters’ use of eloquence, or their receptivity to it, is a telling sign about their 
personality, just as their personality itself has persuasive force. Voltaire designed his char-
acters so that what rhetoricians call the ethical proof—the credibility established by the 
speaker’s character—works strongly in Freind’s favor, while a negative ethos undermines 
his opponents. 
Thus, the rhetoric of the two representatives of the Church is as damaging to their cause 
as their obvious greed and ignorance. Perhaps the lies and non sequiturs which fill the In-
quisitor’s sermon went unchallenged as long as his audience was composed of docile, ter-
ror-ridden Spaniards, but Freind quickly points out that “on ne raisonne point ainsi dans 
la Société royale de Londres” (XXI.527). The Bachelor’s debating technique is likewise as 
revealing as the arguments he uses. The discussion rambles from topic to topic with little 
progression because the Bachelor is unwilling to pursue any question at length. His re-
peated mais, which introduce each of his comments and give the dialogue its name, are 
indicative of his bad faith, of his refusal to seek areas of agreement with Freind. Unable to 
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think for himself, he objects mechanically to whatever Freind says. He has confidence nei-
ther in human reason nor in the Bible and must fall back on authority—the infallibility of 
the Pope as declared by the University of Salamanca. 
Birton’s rhetoric cannot be dismissed so easily. The narrator takes pains to point out that 
he is “plus savant, plus éloquent qu’aucun jeune homme de son âge, mais ne s’étant jamais 
donné la peine de rien approfondir” (XXI.551). This facile eloquence reflects his debonair 
attitude toward life and a certain superficiality in his treatment of philosophical questions. 
He has the kind of mind “qui tient les vraisemblances pour des démonstrations” (XXI.551). 
Still he argues in good faith with Freind, finding one after another point of agreement, until 
he is ultimately converted. He is neither wicked nor stupid, only “évaporé” (XXI.576). 
Voltaire goes out of his way to establish Freind as the ideal orator during his appearance 
before Parliament. The fact that the whole episode is so tenuously linked to the plot and 
that the summary of the speech stresses Freind’s delivery more than his arguments in de-
fense of Peterborough shows that Voltaire’s chief interest is in presenting a model of elo-
quence: 
 
II alla done en parlement: je l’y entendis prononcer un discours ferme et serré, 
sans aucun lieu commun, sans épithète, sans ce que nous appélons des phrases; 
il n’invoquait point un témoignage, une loi; il les attestait, il les citait, il les récla-
mait; il ne disait point qu’on avait surpris la religion de la cour en accusant milord 
Peterborough d’avoir hasardé les troupes de la reine Anne, parce que ce n’était 
pas une affaire de religion; ii ne prodiguait pas à une conjecture le nom de dé-
monstration; il ne manquait pas de respect à l’auguste assemblée du parlement 
par de fades plaisanteries bourgeoises; il n’appélait pas milord Peterborough son 
client, parce que le mot de client signifie un homme de la bourgeoisie protégé 
par un sénateur. Freind parlait avec autant de modestie que de fermeté . . . . 
(XXI.537) 
 
The series of negations is meant as one more condemnation of an artificial style of legal 
oratory Voltaire had often criticized.7 At the same time, Freind’s eloquence is indicative of 
his character; he is a man of calm, controlled sensibility. “Sa raison commande à son coeur” 
(XXI.539). Thus he avoids emotion-laden embellishments in favor of a simple style. He 
refuses to offer hypotheses as proofs. Finally, he has a sense of decorum and the respect 
for his audience that is the mark of an orator who eschews manipulative techniques for 
honest persuasion. 
Freind never got the opportunity to display the full range of his oratorical talents with 
the Bachelor whose arguments tended to self-destruct. Against Birton, however, who twice 
is on the verge of winning over the audience, a less eloquent defender of God might not 
have carried the day. The discussion this time progresses in an orderly fashion as Birton 
and Freind debate God’s existence, evil, and the moral consequences of belief in God. This 
is roughly the same order of topics Voltaire had followed in his Homélie sur l’athéisme 
(1767). In fact, taken as a whole, the debate can be seen as a sermon of sorts. Critics have 
remarked that Birton’s eloquence stems from the fact that there is much of Voltaire in him,8 
and his speeches serve much the same role as the objections a good orator anticipates only 
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to refute. This sustained discussion and final agreement is possible because the two share 
many presuppositions: both feel that overly subtle metaphysical thought is futile, that the 
universe is ordered along Newtonian lines, and that evil is the principal obstacle to belief 
in God. Indeed, the question of God’s goodness is “le fort de la dispute” (XXI.557). As 
Birton puts it at one point, “S’il n’a pas pu empêcher le mal, il est impuissant; s’il l’a pu et 
ne l’a pas voulu, il est barbare” (XXI.562). 
Voltaire spoke in his Encyclopédie article of the “dialectical” basis of persuasion. The pat-
tern of reasoning underlying Friend’s eloquence becomes evident when we consider how 
he deals with this dilemma. His strategy is to treat the problem of evil only in the larger 
framework of the positive links between God and men. Thus his first concern is to demon-
strate what he considers the most important of these points of contact between the human 
and the divine: men can know that God exists (others include conscience, and rewards and 
punishments after death). Then, without denying either the reality of evil, or of God, he 
dissociates the two, changing the relationship by interposing a third element between 
them. As a preliminary, he asserts that the amount of physical evil in the world has been 
exaggerated by writers like “St. Augustin le rhéteur . . . qui . . . prodiguait dans ses écrits 
la figure de l’exagération” (XXI.560–61). The implication is that Freind will avoid such rhe-
torical tricks. He presents evil as merely a by-product of the general laws by which God 
governs the universe. Given these laws, “il est impossible qu’il n’en résulte quelques dé-
sastres particuliers” (XXI.561). He substitutes free will for general laws in his explanation 
of human evil. Men “font un détestable usage de la liberté que ce grand Etre leur a donnée 
et a dû leur donner” (XXI.564). Again God is not directly responsible. Finally, much phys-
ical evil is simply the result of human evil, and he cites the many diseases caused by man’s 
incontinence and immoderation. This may not be an ultimately satisfying solution to the 
problem of evil, but it is marvelous rhetoric. Freind’s use of dissociation in the larger con-
text of God’s ties with men allows him to minimize God’s responsibility while avoiding 
the picture of a God entirely removed from the world. In addition, Freind’s honesty in 
refusing to deny the reality of evil is a chief factor in establishing his credibility in Birton 
and the reader’s eyes. 
So far the discussion of Friend’s eloquence has touched on his choice of arguments and 
their arrangement. A more detailed look at their development will be possible if we com-
pare the presentation of the points of contact between God and men in Jenni and in other 
works Voltaire directed against Holbach’s Système. The goal is not an exhaustive analysis 
of the figures and tropes Freind uses but to show how much his eloquence adds to the 
appeal of his arguments. 
Freind first argues that man can discern in the order of the universe a design, and thus 
know the Designer—God. Such an argument is obviously complex, involving complicated 
analogies and inferences, but in the Lettres de Memmius (1771), Voltaire invests it with the 
succinctness and immediacy of mathematical proof: “Tu crois que j’ai de l’intelligence, 
parce que tu vois de l’ordre dans mes actions, des rapports, et une fin; il y en a mille fois 
plus dans l’arrangement de ce monde: juge done que ce monde est arrangé par une intel-
ligence suprême” (XXVIII.440). Freind tries to retain this immediacy, while avoiding the 
dryness of mathematics by amplifying the visual element only hinted at (tu vois) in the 
Lettres. It is all so simple, he seems to be saying, if you will only open your eyes: “Servez-
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vous de vos yeux, et vous reconnaítrez, vous adorerez un Dieu” (XXI.554). He is successful 
in touching Birton and Jenni because his proofs are, in the narrator’s words, “palpables” 
(XXI.556). His descriptions of the functioning of the universe and the human body have a 
vividness that grips the imagination, while at the same time he implies that his interpreta-
tion of these natural processes in terms of final causes is the only one possible. For example: 
“Les secours dans le corps sont si artificieusement préparés de tous côtés qu’il n’y a pas 
une seule veine qui n’ait ses valvules, ses écluses, pour ouvrir au sang des passages. Depuis 
la racine des cheveux jusqu’aux orteils des pieds, tout est art, tout est préparation, moyen, 
et fin” (XXI.555). Once the listener acquiesces to the vision of order and design implicit in 
the picture Freind paints, the conclusion that God exists seems inescapable. 
Besides making Himself known to man through His works, God has provided, accord-
ing to Freind, a second point of contact in the conscience. In the Lettres de Memmius Voltaire 
makes the assertion in a rather straightforward way: “Le sentiment de la vertu a été mis 
par la nature dans le coeur de l’homme, comme un antidote contre tous les poisons dont il 
devait être dévoré. Vous savez que César eut un remords quand il fut au bord du Rubicon. 
Cette voix secrète qui parle à tous les hommes lui dit qu’il était un mauvais citoyen” 
(XXVIII.460). Freind’s eloquence is able to dramatize this same argument considerably be-
cause its proof is in a sense already within Birton for it is in man’s heart that God has 
inscribed His law. Freind has only to prompt this interior voice to speak out: “N’est-il pas 
vrai que si vous aviez tué votre père et votre mère, cette conscience vous déchirerait par 
des remords aussi affreux qu’involontaires? Cette vérité n’est-elle pas sentie et avouée par 
l’univers entier? Descendons maintenant a de moindres crimes. Y en a-t-il un seul qui ne 
vous effraye au premier coup d’oeil, qui ne vous fasse pâlir la première fois que vous le 
commettez, et qui ne laisse dans votre coeur l’aiguillon du repentir” (XXI.570)? He person-
alizes what he claims to be a universal phenomenon by appealing to Birton’s own experi-
ence of remorse, rather than to that of a third party. His examples (parricide) and choice of 
adjectives and verbs (dechirait, effraye, palir, affreux) evoke emotional extremes. Finally, his 
contention is phrased in a series of sharp questions that seem to compel assent. 
Yet conscience, as Freind conceives it, turns out to be an insufficient moral regulator. It 
acts more as a censor than as a guide and can be stifled by passion or habit. Hence the need 
for an additional link between God and man: punishment or rewards after death. These 
serve both as a deterrent to crime and as a vindication of God’s justice. Here Voltaire states 
his case in Dieu V (1770), one of his immediate responses to the Système. “La philosophie, 
selon vous, ne fournit aucune preuve d’un bonheur à venir. Non; mais vous n’avez aucune 
démonstration du contraire. II se peut qu’il y ait en nous une monade indestructible qui 
sente et qui pense. . . . La raison ne s’oppose point absolument à cette idée, quoique la 
raison seule ne la prouve pas. Cette opinion n’a-t-elle pas un prodigieux avantage sur la 
vôtre? La mienne est utile au genre humain, la vôtre est funeste; elle peut, quoi que vous 
en disiez, encourager les Néron, les Alexandre VI, et les Cartouche; la mienne peut les 
réprimer” (XVIII.377). The argument is particularly vulnerable based as it is on expedi-
ency. Even though he has no proof that the soul is immortal, he asserts that it is useful for 
men to believe in rewards and punishment after death. Nonetheless, Freind develops this 
same argument into a solemn finale which completes Birton and Jenni’s conversion. In 
order to make them overlook his weakest point—the fact that it is at best only possible that 
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the soul exists after death—Freind uses a series of forceful questions and exclamations to 
stress Birton’s admission that he cannot prove the contrary. Once Birton is on the defen-
sive, Freind redefines the meaning of atheist in terms of utility: “n’attendre de Dieu ni 
châtiment ni récompense, c’est être véritablement athée. A quoi servirait l’idée d’un dieu 
qui n’aurait sur vous aucun pouvoir” (XXI.573)? An atheist is not so much one who does 
not believe in God, as one who has no fear of God to regulate his conduct. This skillful shift 
in definition is in keeping with Freind’s emphasis on the practical consequences of belief 
in God and gives him the excuse to dwell on the frightening influence of atheism on the 
poor and the powerful. Amplifying the reference to Cartouche, he paints a grim picture of 
the bas peuple given over to crime and drink, while he devotes a second paragraph to the 
murders committed by Renaissance prelates like Alexander VI. 
These horrors lead to a sober peroration where Freind first sums up his thesis in a bal-
anced period typical of the dignified style he has used throughout: “La croyance d’un dieu 
rémunérateur des bonnes actions, punisseur des méchantes, pardonneur des fautes lé-
gères, est done la croyance la plus utile au genre humain: c’est le seul frein des hommes 
puissants, qui commettent insolemment les crimes publics; c’est le seul frein des hommes 
qui commettent adroitement les crimes secrets” (XXI.574). Then, aware that the peroration 
is the orator’s last opportunity to stir his listeners’ emotions, he evokes in somber tones 
worthy of Bossuet or Massillon the possibility of death at any moment and the agony of 
remorse experienced by the unrepentant on their deathbeds. 
But Freind’s professed desire to provide proofs which speak to the heart has not lead to 
an exclusive dependence on fear or the more sentimental emotions. He is perhaps as satis-
fied by the admiration he elicits for the order of the universe as by the tears of repentance 
Jenni sheds. One of the conte’s most gripping moments occurs at a pause midway in the 
debate when the Indian Parouba, to whom the principles of astronomy have just been ex-
plained, falls to his knees in wonder, exclaiming, “Les cieux announcent Dieu” (XXI.568). 
Yet the most powerful mode of persuasion, and one which appeals to the head as well as 
the heart, is Freind’s character. His virtue is cited to refute Birton’s charge that human 
nature is perverse. His modest awareness of the limits of reason disposes his listeners in 
his favor, and the deep conviction with which he presents his arguments communicates 
an intensity that makes them even more compelling. The effectiveness of this ethical proof 
is evident in Birton’s confession of faith: “je crois en Dieu et en vous” (XXI.575). 
It is not surprising that Birton and Jenni, puppets of Voltaire, are won over but what of 
the reader? J. H. Brumfitt and M. I. Gerard Davis remark that “as a logical demonstration, 
Jenni is far from irrefutable; as a piece of propaganda, it probably only convinces the con-
verted.”9 This is not necessarily a sign of failure, if Clifton Cherpack’s contention is correct 
that Jenni is a defense of Voltaire’s deism, an effort to reassure the authorities angered by 
works like the Système, rather than an attack against atheism.10 Reinforcing convictions is 
as legitimate a goal of the art of persuasion as conversion. This conte is the culmination of 
a number of works written by Voltaire between 1770 and 1775 in the wake of the Système. 
As the comparisons have shown, Freind’s eloquence tends to strengthen the appeal of Vol-
taire’s arguments. L’art de bien dire in Freind’s hands is able to add to the persuasive force 
of his arguments because he has chosen to emphasize ones which lend themselves to strik-
ing presentation. He has avoided the more abstract demonstrations of God’s existence, 
C A R R ,  K E N T U C K Y  R O M A N C E  Q U A R T E R L Y  2 5  (1 9 7 8 )  
8 
such as the one based on a prime mover used in Il faut prendre un parti (1772) in favor of 
the proof from design which invites vivid evocations of the order of nature. Freind’s dra-
matic appeals to the heart are all the more effective because he sees it as the seat of moral 
experience, just as his argument for rewards and punishments after death based on expe-
diency is well served by his tableaux painting the “cercle abominable de brutalités” 
(XXI.573) of an atheist society. From the point of view of pure logic Jenni may not be any 
more adequate a refutation of the Système than the works which precede it. Yet if Voltaire 
chooses to rest his case with Jenni, it is perhaps because he has finally stated his position 
with an eloquence that more than matches that of Holbach. 
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